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Two great drives are constantly in motion to abridge, in the name of
education, the complete division of religion and civil authority which our
forefathers made. One is to introduce religious education and observ-
ances into the public schools. The other, to obtain public funds for the aid
and support of various private religious schools. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
A significant decline in private enrollment since 1965,2 coupled
1. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
2. In the 1980-1981 school year a total of forty-one million students attended
public elementary and secondary schools, while enrollment in private
schools was five million students. Enrollment levels in 1965 were 37.2 million
students in public schools and 5.6 million students in private schools. This
TUITION TAX DEDUCTIONS
with financial pressure caused by inflation, has caused private
schools to seek additional funding through higher tuition charges
and various forms of state aid.3 State legislative responses to the
economic distress of private schools have sought to minimize the
burden of private school tuition for parents who decide not to en-
roll their children in "free" tax-supported schools. 4 At the federal
level, legislation has regularly been proposed to create tuition tax
credits,5 and the Reagan Administration supports such a bill in the
current session of Congress.6
represents a fourteen percent decline in nonpublic school enrollment during
a period when attendance in public schools increased by ten percent. NAT'L
CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION
OF EDUCATION 44 (1982); NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 8 (1982).
The significance of this decline in nonpublic school enrollment is that
such schools operate at less than optimal size, resulting in higher per pupil
operating costs and inefficient use of capital facilities. Factors such as geo-
graphic migration patterns, changes in public attitudes, and changes in the
social role of the church and its religious education component have contrib-
uted to this enrollment decline. DoerT, Implications of Supreme Court Deci-
sions for Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF
SCHOOL FINANCE 188 (K. Alexander & K. Jordan ed. 1973).
3. In the 1979 to 1980 school year, total receipts for public elementary and secon-
dary schools amounted to over $100.9 billion, of which only $200 million was
non-governmental support (primarily student fees and private contribu-
tions). In contrast, private elementary and secondary schools received $11.8
billion, all of which was received from student fees, private contributions and
other non-governmental sources. NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 19 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 826 (1973) (Pennsylvania statute pro-
vided reimbursement, not to exceed tuition paid, for students in private ele-
mentary and secondary schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 763 (1973) (New York statute provided tuition
grants for low income parents of private school students, not to exceed fifty
percent of tuition paid); Grit v. Woiman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), affg 353 F. Supp.
744, 749-50 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (Ohio statute allowed tax credit for private school
tuition expenses); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855,
857 (1st Cir. 1980) (Rhode Island statute authorized tax deductions for ele-
mentary and secondary school educational expenses).
5. See, e.g., S. 311, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 1526 (1977) (tax credits
for tuition, fees, and other higher education expenses up to $500); S. 2673, 97th
Cong., 2d. Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S7406-08 (daily ed. June 23, 1982) (credit only
for tuition at elementary and secondary schools). In 1978, separate tuition
tax credit bills passed both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Disagreement over credits for elementary and secondary school expenses
prevented either measure from receiving conference committee approval.
See 124 CONG. REC. 37,566-69 (1978) (discussing H.R. 12050, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 25378-79 (1978)).
6. See S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. § 1335-42 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
1983). The proposal, entitled the Educational Opportunity and Equity Act of
1983, provides for tuition tax credits up to a limit of $100 in 1983, $200 in 1984,
and $300 in 1985 and subsequent years. The bill also includes a phase out of
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The constitutionality of government aid to private schools has
been vigorously contested during the past thirty years.7 Oppo-
nents of aid to private schools contend that such aid advances reli-
gion or religious institutions in violation of the establishment
clause of the first amendment,8 while proponents argue that the
aid is justified or even necessary to avoid infringement of their
rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.9 In
Mueller v. Allen,i0 the United States Supreme Court upheld a Min-
nesota statute" which authorized tax deductions for tuition and
other school-related expenses incurred by dependents attending
public and private elementary and secondary schools. The Court
found that the statute satisfied the three-part establishment clause
test 2 of Lemon v. Kurtzman.13
The decision in Mueller may mark the beginning of an accom-
modationist14 trend regarding state aid to church-related private
schools. On the other hand, such trends are not easily discernible
tuition tax credit benefits beginning with families earning $40,000 and ending
with those earning $50,000. Parents could claim a non-refundable tax credit
equal to fifty percent of the qualified tuition expenses paid for any qualified
dependent. The bill's sponsor, Sen. Robert Dole, has estimated the cost of
the legislation at $800 million a year when fully effective in 1986. Public Hear-
ing on Tuition Tax Credits', Senate Committee on Finance (April 27, 1983)
(Tax Notes Microfiche Data Base 83-4063 (May 9, 1983)). The current annual
federal tax expenditure for public school districts has been estimated to be
$13.7 billion. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURE SUBSMY TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS (April 27, 1983) (Tax Notes Microfiche
Data Base 83-4062 (1983)).
7. See infra notes 36-96 and accompanying text. Aid to private schools necessar-
ily involves aid to sectarian schools since the vast majority of private school
students, currently eighty-four percent, attend church-affiliated schools.
NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 49 (1982).
8. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..."
U.S. CONsT. amend. L The establishment clause is made applicable to the
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
9. See supra note 8. The free exercise clause is made applicable to the states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
10. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
11. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). See infra note 98.
12. The three-part establishment clause test was originally enunciated as fol-
lows: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose. second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
13. Id. For a discussion of the development of the three-part test, see infra,
notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
14. Accommodation refers to a doctrine which favors fewer restrictions on gov-
ernment aid to religious institutions.
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since the decisions of the Supreme Court in this area are widely
regarded as lacking a consistent, integrated doctrinal approach.15
The Court's heavy reliance on factual distinctions in parochial
school aid decisions has resulted in ad hoc decisionmaking which
offers little guidance to state legislatures and makes predictions
regarding the constitutionality of various types of aid virtually im-
possible.16 Since opponents and proponents of aid to religious
schools are uncertain as to the constitutional standards, each side
resorts to litigation to resolve the fate of particular aid programs.17
This Article will provide a historical overview of the develop-
15. The decisions of the Court regarding state aid to private religious schools
have been sharply criticized by commentators. See, e.g., Young, Constitu-
tional Validity of State Aid to Pupils in Church Related Schools-Internal
Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHio ST.
W. 783 (1977). The school aid establishment clause cases have been charac-
terized as "a series of case-by-case compromises rather than the develop-
ment of constitutional principles of more lasting guidance... [where] there
seemed to be no logical basis for distinguishing one program from the other."
Id. at 794. The Court itself on various occasions has admitted the absence of
an integrated doctrine in this area. In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980), Justice White noted.
Establishment Clause cases are not easy;.., we are divided among
ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the
people of this country. What is certain is that our decisions have
tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at
either end of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices
clarity and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the
case until the continuing interaction between the courts and the
States... produces a single, more encompassing construction of the
Establishment Clause.
Id. at 662. See also Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VnL. L. REV. 3,23
(1978); Schotten, infra note 25, at 248-49.
16. One commentator has characterized this ad hoc weakness as the result of
"[i] nadequate craftmanship." Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectar-
ian Schools: A Final Installment? 1973 Stp. CT. REV. 57, 94 (1973). 'The set-
tlements of major issues of Constitutional politics must be acceptable to
major interest groupings over the long haul or they will not hold up ....
Inadequate craftmanship marginally encourages such continuing hostilities
and the attendant perceptions of instability in constitutional law." Id.
17. The predominant group among proponents of aid for church-related schools
has been Catholic educators. During the past thirty years groups such as the
U.S. Catholic Conference, Citizens for Educational Freedom, the National As-
sociation of Hebrew Day Schools, the National Catholic Conference, the
Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, and the Knights of Columbus
have lobbied or litigated in support of aid to church-related schools. Separa-
tionist (no-aid) interests have included the American Civil Liberties Union,
the NAACP, the National Council of Churches, local coalitions such as the
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PEARL) in the New
York area, and prominent individual separationists such as Leo Pfeffer. See
Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: Historical Overview and Future
Prognosis, 24 ST. Lotus UJ.J. 183, 193 (1980); Morgan, supra note 16, at 59-60.
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ment of the three-part establishment clause test for state legisla-
tive enactments which aid private religious schools. The Mueller
decision will be examined in light of previous decisions to deter-
mine whether the Court's reliance on certain critical factors is con-
sistent with precedent. Particular emphasis will be placed on
identifying the policy bases for these decisions, especially in light
of the historical and modern interpretation of the establishment
clause. Finally, the implications of Mueller will be explored, and
an approach will be suggested for judging the constitutionality of
various forms of state aid to religious schools.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE-PART
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST
A. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
The religion clauses of the first amendment are cast in abso-
lute,18 yet undefined, terms designed to protect the autonomy of
religious belief and conduct and to ensure the separation of church
and state.'9 At times the two religion clauses are compatible and,
in some respects, mutually supportive.20 Generally, when state
contact with religion is avoided, the autonomy of private religious
choice is preserved.21 The Supreme Court has followed three ma-
jor policies in developing the constitutional doctrine of religious
liberty: voluntarism of religious belief, government neutrality to-
ward religion, and separation of church and state.22 Conflicts and
inconsistent results have arisen in applying these three principles
18. 'The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if ex-
panded to a logical extreme would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
19. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrru-
TIONAL LAw § 14-4, at 818 (1978).
20. L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONsTIrrUToNAL LAW § 14-2, at 814 (1978).
21. See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishmen4 and Doctrinal
Development: Part II, The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L REV. 513
(1968).
22. See Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tui-
tion Tax Credit, 92 HAxv. L REv. 696, 697-99 (1979). Voluntarism embodies
the belief that religious conviction should not result from government coer-
cion, but from private individual choice. The principle of government neutral-
ity follows, and is a means of preserving, individual voluntarism in religious
belief. The purpose and the effect of a government enactment must be neu-
tral toward religion, avoiding either "advancement or inhibition of religion."
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). Separation of
church and state involves removing religion from the political sphere, a goal
which reinforces the policies of neutrality and voluntarism. A fourth policy,
absolutism, or the "no-aid" doctrine, has been rejected by the Court. See in-
fra note 41 and accompanying text.
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as the government's role in providing services has expanded. "A
system of government that makes itself felt as pervasively as ours
could hardly be expected never to cross paths with the church."23
For example, a strict separationist approach, denying any general
government services, such as police and fire protection to religious
institutions, would be hostile toward, and would discourage, the
free exercise of religion; thus, the separationist approach, if carried
to the extreme, would result in the infringement of voluntarism
and neutrality. 24
These three conflicting policy considerations (voluntarism, neu-
trality, and separation) have largely frustrated the development of
clear constitutional principles to be applied when the government
gives assistance to private elementary and secondary schools. 25
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has developed a three-part test
as "a guide with which to identify instances in which the objectives
of the establishment clause have been impaired."26 The tripartite
test appears to serve "more as a framework for structuring opin-
23. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976).
24. See Giannella, supra note 21, at 520.
25. See Schotten, The Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Reli-
gious Entanglement: The Constitutional Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elemen-
tary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FoREsT I- REV. 207 (1979). "In no area
of constitutional law has the lack of principle appeared so obvious as in re-
cent Supreme Court opinions interpreting first amendment establishment
clause restrictions upon governmental funding of nonpublic elementary and
secondary schools." Id. at 209.
26. Young, supra note 15, at 787-80. However, in the recent case of Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court refused to apply the tripartite test
to an establishment clause question. In Marsh, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of Nebraska's use of a paid chaplain to open legislative sessions
with prayers which were recorded and subsequently published at public ex-
pense. The Court relied extensively on the fact that the practice of opening
sessions of Congress with prayer had continued for 200 years and a similiar
practice had been followed in Nebraska's legislature for over 100 years. Id. at
3336. This holding appears to carve out a significant exception to the applica-
tion of the tripartite test in establishment clause questions: Where history
reveals that the challenged activity was accepted by the framers of the consti-
tution, the Court will not interpret the establishment clause to impose more
stringent limits on the states than the framers had originally imposed on the
federal government.
This rejection of the tripartite test where the government activity is sup-
ported by "unique history" suggests that historical patterns of government
conduct can justify contemporary violations of the establishment clause. The
importance of such historical evidence had also been suggested in Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673-80 (1970). See infra notes 54-64 and accompa-
nying text. However, in Walz the Court applied the tripartite analysis and
relied substantially on free exercise consideration to reach its decision up-
holding tax exemptions for church property. Id. at 674-75. Such balancing of
the religion clauses was absent in Marsh.
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ions than as a guidepost for determining the outcome."27 Since the
objectives of the establishment clause are too vague to be out-
come-determinative, 28 the Court has relied on the tripartite test
primarily as a means of evaluating various forms of aid,29 while
engaging in factual comparisons with prior cases to determine the
constitutionality of such aid.30 A review of the historical develop-
ment of the three-part test is helpful to understand how the ele-
ments of the test are applied and to see which particular forms of
aid have been judged unconstitutional under the tripartite
framework.
B. Building and Breaching the Wall of Separation-MAid to Sectarian
Schools
At the time the first amendment was adopted no public schools
existed in the United States. The structure of American education
has changed markedly since then. The religion clauses also pre-
ceded any general acknowledgment of the need for universal for-
mal education.3 1 In 1925, the Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,32 found that an Oregon statute requiring compulsory at-
tendance at public schools was unconstitutional. The Court held
that parents had the right to choose whether to send their children
to public or private schools.3 3 Pierce did not hold that the state
must provide financial assistance to parents who wish to educate
27. Young, supra note 15, at 788.
28. Id.
29. The Court in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, (1975), explained.
These tests constitute a convenient, accurate distillation of this
Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range of gov-
ernmental action challenged as violative of the constitutional prohi-
bition against laws 'respecting an establishment of religion,' and thus
provide the proper framework of analysis for the issues presented in
the case before us.
Id. at 358.
30. At least one commentator has claimed that the Court's holdings under such
an approach resemble a legislative process without the benefit of hearings,
contacts with interested constituents and lobbyists, and policy studies.
'Thus the Court's decisions have been determined, not by the weighing of
policy alternatives, but by the contested program's ability or inability to pass
the series of legal tests previously outlined." Schotten, supra note 25, at 214-
15.
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). For a comprehensive discussion
of the development of public and private educational systems in the United
States, see L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 168-297 (1975).
For a history of public and private education from a judicial perspective, see
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,212-32 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., separate opinion).
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. The decision in Pierce was not based on the first amendment religion clauses,
since neither clause had been held applicable to the states at the time Pierce
[Vol. 63:572
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their children in parochial schools, or even that the state may do
so ;3 rather, Pierce's significance lies in its recognition that private
schools perform important and manifestly public functions. 35
The first establishment clause case challenging governmental
aid to private schools to reach the Supreme Court was Everson v.
Board of Education.36 Justice Black wrote, in sweeping separa-
tionist terms, that: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called."3 7 Yet, while contending that the purpose of
the establishment clause was to enact "a wall of separation be-
tween church and State,"3 8 Black upheld a statute which author-
ized the payment of bus fares for students attending private
religious schools. This "public welfare legislation" 39 did not violate
the establishment clause since the aid benefited the church-affili-
ated schools only incidentally.40 The court reasoned that to pro-
hibit the state from providing general welfare benefits to all
children would violate the neutral position required by the first
amendment.4 1 The tension in Everson between the Court's "Wall
of separation" doctrine and the holding in the decision was duly
noted in Justice Jackson's dissentA2 The effect of the holding was
was decided. Instead, the Court relied on the economic due process concept
of the fourteenth amendment.
34. Schotten, supra note 25, at 230.
35. Id. at 231.
36. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. Justice Black relied on Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), for
this Jeffersonian view of the establishment clause.
39. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
40. The Court emphasized the indirect nature of the aid to religious schools
which were in compliance with secular educational requirements imposed by
the state. "The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not sup-
port them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Id. at 18. The holding in
Everson was consistent with prior Supreme Court opinions upholding gen-
eral welfare programs that incidentally benefited religion. See Quick Bear v.
Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908) (fund for education of Indian children may be
used for church-related schools); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 299-300
(1899) (government financial assistance to church-affiliated hospital was not a
violation of the first amendment).
41. This was an important acknowledgment that absolute separation of church
and state is not required by the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Denying general governmental services to religious institutions would create
an infringement of free exercise rights. "[The First] Amendment requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
42. '"The case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is
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to swell the hopes of accommodationists: although the bus plan
"approache [d] the verge" 43 of impermissible aid to church schools,
the plan was saved by the fact that the immediate beneficiaries
were individuals. This was the beginning of the individual-benefit
theory.44
The development of the establishment clause doctrine during
the next sixteen years 45 culminated in the test announced in
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.46 In striking
down state-mandated Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer in public schools, the Court held that, in order for legisla-
tion "to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."47
that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er con-
sent,"-consented.'" Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 16.
44. Under this theory, a state may provide financial assistance or educational
benefits to the individual student, but may not do so directly to the church-
related school. See Giannella, supra note 21, at 576. The child-benefit theory
has been criticized because it "places form over substance," Choper, The Es-
tablishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALI. L. Rxv. 260, 313
(1968), and because it permits public funds to be used "for strictly religious
purposes... in contravention of a basic thrust of the establishment clause"
whenever the amount of aid received "exceeds the value of secular education
service." Id. at 315-16. See also infra note 131 and accompanying text.
45. From 1947 to 1963, the Court decided five establishment clause cases: Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (recitation of nondenominational prayer in public
school system found unconstitutional, applying a primary effect test); Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (statute requiring state appointees to de-
clare a belief in God held unconstitutional, applying both secular purpose
and primary effect tests); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday
closing laws upheld solely on basis of secular purpose); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) (off-premises released time program for religious instruc-
tion upheld, applying a primary effect test); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (on-premises religious instruction at tax-sup-
ported public school system found unconstitutional, applying only a primary
effect test).
46. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
47. Id. at 222. Secular purpose and primary effect were the first two parts of the
tripartite test. The final criterion was supplied seven years later in Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying
text. The earliest decisions of the Court under the establishment clause con-
tained no evaluation of legislative purpose. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
The secular purpose test permits the Court to ascertain the legislature's pur-
pose where it has failed to enunciate one, or to judge the credibility of a pur-
pose stated within the enactment. The Court is reluctant to search for an
unarticulated religious purpose so long as a secular purpose has been estab-
lished. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 782 n.38 (1973) (stated secular purposes were accepted despite exist-
ence of religious purposes revealed by the effect of the enactment). Perhaps
[Vol. 63:572
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Advocates of aid to religious schools received a boost in Board
of Education v. Allen ,48 which upheld a New York statute requir-
ing school boards to loan approved textbooks to all secondary
school children, including students in parochial schools. 4 9 The
Court found that the enactment passed the secular purpose/pri-
mary effect test by concluding that the "processes of secular and
religious training [in church-related schools] are [not] so inter-
twined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public
are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion."5 0 Thus, the
Court found that parochial schools serve two separable functions,
religious training and secular education-only the latter of which
may be funded by the state.51 Reinforcing its finding that the stat-
ute was secular in purpose and effect,52 the Allen Court further
recognized that private education provided a valuable service to
society.
53
The Supreme Court announced the third element of the tripar-
the best formulation of the secular purpose test is that a religious purpose
will invalidate legislation "only... if the absence of any substantial legisla-
tive purpose, other than a religious one, is made to appear." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The primary effect test has been described as a two step analysis which is
designed to ensure that the aid will not be used to advance or inhibit religion.
Note, Laws Respecting an Establishment of Religion An Inquiry into Tuition
Tax Benefits., 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 227-28 (1983). See also Note, Establish-
ment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74
CoLum. L. REV. 1175, 1182-86 (1974). First, an inquiry is made into the nature
of the aid and the service or activity which is subsidized. In parochial school
aid cases, this determination focuses on whether the aid substantially bene-
fits the secular educational function of the school and whether the aid is ca-
pable of being separated from the religious function of the school. Second,
the Court looks at the "narrowness of the benefitted class." Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). If the aid is
substantial and cannot be separated from the school's religious function, the
Court looks to the characteristics of the actual beneficiaries to determine
whether the effect is to aid a primarily sectarian class. However, the Court, in
Mueller v. Allen, has rejected such a defacto analysis of the benefited class.
See infra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
48. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
49. This decision was consistent with Cochran v. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370,
375 (1930), which upheld state loans of secular textbooks to students in reli-
gious schools under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
50. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
51. This notion of separability was rejected in subsequent decisions in favor of
the permeation theory, i.e., that the religious mission of the church-related
school makes its educational function pervasively sectarian. See, e.g., Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80
(1973).
52. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
53. "[P]rivate education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role
in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience .... [A]
wide segment of informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that
19841
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tite test in Walz v. Tax Commission.5 4 Chief Justice Burger ap-
plied the two-part test enunciated in Schempp to uphold New York
tax exemptions on properties used exclusively for religious wor-
ship.55 The grant of exemption was found to have a proper legisla-
tive purpose, as its aim was neither to advance nor inhibit
religion.56 In determining the effect of the exemption, the Walz
Court found that taxation of religious property would result in a
greater degree of involvement between government and religion
than granting exemptions. 57 The Court noted that the primary is-
sue was "whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a
continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance lead-
ing to an impermissible degree of entanglement."58 In dictum, Bur-
ger commented: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a
relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most govern-
mental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed
administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or ad-
ministrative standards."59
Several critical factors stand out in the Walz evaluation of the
[religious] schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education to
their students." Id.
54. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
55. The Supreme Court had not previously considered this question. In Gibbons
v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 406-07 (1886), the Court had decided that
certain church property, which was used to produce income, came within a
property tax exemption created by Congress. The Court in Gibbon implicitly
accepted that Congress had the power to grant exemptions to religious
organizations.
56. The Court concluded that the legislative purpose of a property tax exemption
was neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion.
[I]t is neither sponsorship nor hostility. New York, in common with
the other states, has determined that certain entities that exist in a
harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster
its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those proper-
ties for nonpayment of taxes.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
57. Id. at 674. The Court compared the involvement resulting from taxation with
that resulting from exemption:
Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of
government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax
liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts
that follow in the train of those legal processes. Granting tax exemp-
tions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic
benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than
taxing them.
Id. at 674-75.
58. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
59. Id. The focus of inquiry in Walz was on excessive administrative entangle-
ment. In subsequent decisions the Court considered a separate element-
political divisiveness. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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constitutionality of the property tax exemptions: the breadth of
the benefited class, 60 the form of the tax benefit, 61 and the social
benefits conferred on society by the benefited religious institu-
tions. 62 The Walz Court also stressed the fact that 200 years of
freedom from taxation had not led to an established state church
or religion; instead, it had fostered the free exercise of all forms of
religious belief.63 This emphasis on historical patterns of govern-
ment conduct has recently been used to override the traditional
tripartite test in other establishment clause questions.
6 4
Although the Walz decision introduced the concept of "exces-
sive entanglement" as a part of the "primary effect" criterion, it
was not until Lemon v. Kurtzman65 that the entanglement issue
took on the dimensions of a separate constitutional test. Invalidat-
ing state subsidies for parochial school teachers' salaries, the
Court in Lemon seized the opportunity to describe two elements of
the entanglement criterion. Administrative entanglement analysis
focused on the form of the aid to determine whether it would result
in "a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government
direction of church schools and hence of churches." 6 6 The Court
found that "comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state
60. The Court did not rely upon any statistical evidence of the actual benefi-
ciaries under the tax exemption, but rather acknowledged the breadth of the
benefited class in evaluating the secular legislative purpose of the exemption:
[The state] has not singled out one particular church or religious
group or even churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to
all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property
owned by non profit, quasi-public corporations which include hospi-
tals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical and pa-
triotic groups.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
61. The Court conceded that granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily re-
sulted in some indirect economic benefit to religion, but found that the re-
stricted nature of the fiscal relationship tended to reinforce the separation of
church and state: "The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the
government does not transfer part of its revenues to churches but simply ab-
stains from demanding that the church support the state." Id. at 675.
62. This consideration was part of the Court's secular legislative purpose inquiry.
'The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial
and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification use-
ful, desirable, and in the public interest." Id. at 673. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan stated that tax exemptions to religious institutions en-
couraged public service activities for the well-being of society and contrib-
uted to the pluralism of American society. Id. at 692 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). However, it is not clear that the finding of social contributions to
society by religious institutions should preclude a finding that the state aid
resulted in an impermissible establishment of religion.
63. Id. at 674-76.
64. See supra note 26.
65. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
66. Id. at 620.
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surveillance [would] inevitably be required" to ensure that sup-
port of "a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated
with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets" resulted
in aid to only the secular teaching component and not to advance-
ment of religious doctrine. 67 Direct salary aid to parochial schools
was impermissible because it would require extensive state sur-
veillance and control to ensure that only secular educational func-
tions would be aided.68 This relationship between the secular
effects test and the entanglement test has been described as an
"insoluable paradox"6 9 and as a "Scylla and Charybdis" di-
lemma;70 it is difficult to satisfy one without violating the other. In
order to pass the primary effect test, legislation providing direct
aid to parochial schools must include a mechanism to ensure that
religion is not aided. Yet, the very procedures which are required
to prevent aid from going to nonsecular functions, are also likely to
impermissibly entangle the government in the operation of reli-
gious schools.
The Lemon decision described a second aspect of entangle-
ment--"political divisiveness." 71 The Court feared that partisans
of parochial schools, and those who opposed state aid, would "inev-
itably champion [their] cause and promote political action to
achieve their goals."72 This struggle could, in turn, threaten the
normal political process if votes on such issues aligned with reli-
gious faith.73 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, ob-
67. Id. at 618 Clearly the notion in Allen of dual and separable secular and reli-
gious functions in parochial schools was replaced in Lemon with a strong pre-
sumption that parochial schools are pervasively religious institutions.
"[C]hurch-related elementary and secondary schools are controlled by reli-
gious organizations, have the purpose of propogating and promoting a partic-
ular religious faith, and conduct their operations to fulfill that purpose." Id. at
620.
68. Id. at 621.
69. As the lone dissent in Lemon, Justice White described the dilemma posed by
the primary effect and entanglement prongs of the establishment clause test-
The state cannot finance secular instruction if it permits religion to
be taught in the same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that reli-
gion not be so taught-a promise the school and its teachers are
quite willing and on this record able to give-and enforces it, it is
then entangled in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 668 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788
(1973).
71. 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
72. Id. at 622. The Court noted that the Lemon case involved "successive and
very likely permanent annual appropriations which benefit relatively few
religious groups." Id. at 623.
73. The Court reasoned that religious political strife would "tend to obscure and
confuse other issues of great urgency" diverting legislative attention from
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served that "political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended
to protect."74 This pronouncement by Chief Justice Burger was
somewhat ironic since, only one year earlier in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, he had noted the right of religious institutions to take
strong political stands in public controversies. 75
Two years after Lemon, in Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,7 6 the Supreme Court invalidated a
New York statute7 7 which provided three categories of aid to paro-
chial schools: direct grants to parochial schools in low-income ar-
"the myriad issues and problems which confront every level of government."
Id. at 623.
74. Id. at 622. The Court cited Professor Paul A. Freund for this proposition.
Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969).
Freund attempted to reconcile his preference for political activism and judi-
cial restraint with his desire for the Court to play an active role in limiting
parochial schools:
Ordinarily I am disposed, in grey-area cases of constitutional law, to
let the political process function. Even in dealing with basic guaran-
tees I would eschew a single form of compliance and leave room for
different methods of implementation, whether in pre-trial interroga-
tion under the privilege against self-incrimination, or libel of public
figures under freedom of the press, or exclusion of evidence under
the search and seizure guarantee. The religious guarantees, how-
ever, are of a different order. While political debate and division is
normally a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations,
political division on religious lines is one of the principal evils that
the first amendment sought to forestall.
Id. at 1691-92.
A full-scale challenge to Freund's position can be found in Valente &
Stanmeyer, Public Aid to Parochial Schools-A Reply to Professor Freund, 59
GEo. L.J. 59 (1970). See also Schotten, supra note 25, at 222-28. Schotten con-
tends that Freund's view is contrary to the ideas of James Madison, who was
the father of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Id. at 224. Madison believed
that the protection of religious liberty depended on the multiplicity of reli-
gious sects and that by encouraging religious diversity the dangers of polit-
ical fragmentation along religious lines, persecution, and strife would be
minimized. Id. at 225. Such a position is inconsistent with the notion of
prohibiting legislative consideration of an issue affecting religion under the
first amendment.
75. In Walz, Chief Justice Burger observed.
Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently
take strong positions on public issues including, as this case reveals
in the several briefs amici, vigorous advocacy of legal or constitu-
tional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and
private citizens have that right. No perfect or absolute separation is
really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an in-
volvement of sorts--one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid ex-
cessive entanglement.
397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
76. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
77. Health and Safety Grants for Nonpublic School Children, 1972 N.Y. LAws ch.
414, § 1 (amending N.Y. EDUC. LAW art. 12, §§ 549-53 (McKinney 1972)).
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eas for maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities; tuition
reimbursement grants for parents of parochial school students
with an annual taxable income less than $5000;78 and a tax benefit
program to provide tax relief for parents who failed to qualify for
tuition reimbursement.79 The New York legislature had structured
the program to avoid the "insoluable paradox" referred to by Jus-
tice White in Lemon v. KurtzmanO by providing funding in a man-
ner which offered "a statistical guarantee of neutrality."8 1 The
Nyquist Court, however, rejected this argument. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, noted: "Our cases have ... long since
foreclosed the notion that mere statistical assurances will suffice
to sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of 'effect' and 'entangle-
ment.' "82 Instead, the Court concluded that the maintenance/re-
pair grants, and the tuition reimbursement grants, failed the
primary effect test, since neither were limited to the secular func-
tions of parochial schools.83 Distinguishing the tax benefit pro-
gram from the situation in Walz v. Tax Commission,8 4 Justice
78. The "reimbursements" were actually fixed at a flat rate of 50 dollars per grade
school student and 100 dollars per high school student, limited to fifty percent
of actual tuition paid.
79. The tax relief plan authorized a deduction for state income tax purposes of a
designated amount unrelated to the amount of tuition actually paid. The al-
lowable deduction decreased as income increased, so that no deductions
were available for parents with a gross income in excess of $25,000.
80. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
81. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 787
(1973). The State of New York argued that, since tuition reimbursements
were funded at only fifty percent of actual expenses, and since nonsecular
educational costs were calculated to be thirty percent of the total cost of paro-
chial education, the maximum tuition reimbursement by the State was only
fifteen percent of total education costs. It was argued that this amount of aid
was statistically neutral since the state's compulsory education laws required
more than fifteen percent of resources to be devoted to secular instruction.
Id.
82. Id. at 787-88.
83. The maintenance/repair grants were found to be unlike the "neutral, nonide-
ological aid, assisting only the secular function" which had been upheld in
Everson and Allen. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973).
While the tuition reimbursement grants in Nyquist were delivered to par-
ents rather than schools, the Court found that the indirect nature of the aid
was "only one among many factors to be considered", id. at 782, and that the
unmistakable effect of the aid was to impermissibly support sectarian institu-
tions. Id. at 783.
84. The Court noted that the property tax exemption which was approved in
Walz could be distinguished in three important ways from the legislation
challenged in Nyquist. First, property tax exemptions had enjoyed a long
history of political approval, whereas the tax benefits for parents of parochial
school students were a "recent innovation." Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973). Second, the tax benefits
in Nyquist flowed to a narrow class of beneficiaries comprised predominantly
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Powell concluded that "insofar as such benefits render assistance
to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their pur-
pose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious
institutions."85
Although finding the state aid in Nyquist unconstitutional
under the "primary effect" test, the Court went on to observe that
the aid in question "carried grave potential for entanglement in the
broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion."8 6
This danger was further aggravated by the recurring annual appro-
priation process and the likelihood of demands for increased
amount of aid.87 Thus, the political divisiveness element of the en-
tanglement criterion was sustained as a viable test regarding the
permissibility of state aid to parochial schools. 88
In Wolman v. Walter,8 9 the Supreme Court approved programs
of substantial aid to elementary and secondary parochial school
students.90 Although not involving direct aid to parents of paro-
chial school students, the decision in Wolman is an important part
of the historical development leading to the Mueller v. Allen deci-
sion for a number of reasons. First, the Wolman opinion reveals
the underlying tensions within the Court which result in a frag-
mented and compromised approach to parochial school aid.91 Sec-
of parents of children attending parochial schools, unlike the Walz exemp-
tion which broadly "covered all property devoted to religious, educational, or
charitable purposes." Id. at 794. Finally, the Court concluded that the tax
benefit in Nyquist did not have "the elements of a genuine tax deduction,
such as for charitable contributions," id. at 790 n.49, and was, therefore, unre-
lated to deductions for charitable contributions to religious institutions which
were found acceptable under the "benevolent neutrality" test of Watz.
85. Id. at 793.
86. Id. at 794.
87. Id. at 795-97.
88. The dissent, however, argued that the entanglement criterion "is of remote
relevance.., with respect to the validity of tuition grants or tax credits in-
volving or requiring no relationships whatsoever between the State and any
church or any church school." Id. at 822.
89. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
90. Wolman involved a challenge to an Ohio statute which authorized $88 million
per biennium (enacted as twelve separate and severable categories of aid)
for parochial schools. The Court upheld nine aid categories: textbooks loans
to pupils; standardized testing and scoring; diagnostic services (speech, hear-
ing and psychological testing) provided on the school premises by non-paro-
chial school employees; therapeutic services (speech, hearing, and
psychological therapy) provided off of school premises; and programs for
emotionally disturbed mentally handicapped children. The Court invalidated
aid for the purchase and loan of instructional aids and transportation for field
trips limited to trips the same as those provided in public schools. Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-55 (1977).
91. Six Justices voted to uphold the loan of secular textbooks under the principle
of Board of Educ. v. Allen; yet, only three Justices voted to approve the ex-
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ond, the Court demonstrated a willingness to place considerably
less emphasis on the political divisiveness test.92 Third, the Court
was willing to permit substantial amounts of aid to parochial
schools by emphasizing that the benefits accrued to the students,
not the schools, 93 and that the forms of aid lacked the potential for
fostering ideological views.94 In addition, the Wolman decision
suggested that Justice Powell was ready to join the accommoda-
tionist voting block of Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice White.95 Finally, the opinion in Wolman revealed the re-
luctance of several Justices to affirm the application of the three-
part establishment clause test.96
penditure of state funds for the purchase and loan of instructional aids. Such
inconsistent results regarding forms of aid which are virtually indistinguish-
able has led one commentator to characterize the Wolman decision as "either
judicial indecision or hair-splitting." Schotten, supra note 25, at 245. The
Court acknowledged the apparent inconsistency regarding textbooks and in-
structional materials, noting that Allen was being followed simply as a matter
of stare decisis. "When faced ... with a choice between extension of the
unique presumption created in Allen and continued adherence to the princi-
ples announced in our subsequent cases, we choose the latter course." Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252 n.18 (1977).
92. In Wolman the Court's emphasis was on the extent to which the various
forms of aid would give rise to administrative entanglement as a result of
state monitoring and surveillance of the aid programs. Only Justice Brennan,
dissenting from the portions of the Court's opinion which invalidated aid for
field trips and loans of instruction aids, mentioned this criterion, concluding
that the Ohio program posed "a divisive political potential of unusual magni-
tude." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977). (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
93. The "child-benefit" principle was applied in upholding aid for testing and
scoring, diagnostic and therapeutic services, and was applied in striking
down aid for field trips. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
94. The inapplicability of th6 aid for religious ideological advancement was em-
phasized in upholding aid for textbooks, testing and scoring, diagnostic and
therapeutic services, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-48 (1977), and in
striking down aid for instructional materials. Id. at 248-51.
95. For an extensive review and analysis of the voting patterns and reasoning of
individual Justices in establishment clause decisions through 1973, see Mor-
gan, supra note 16. In Wolman, Justice Powell, who authored the Court's
opinion in striking down aid in Nyquist, praised the educational and social
value of parochial schools for offering "an educational alternative for millions
of young Americans; ... wholesome competition with our public schools; and
... [substantial relief from] the tax burden incident to the operation of pub-
lic schools." Wolian v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Retreating from his concern in Nyquist over religious/political strife,
see supra note 86 and accompanying text, Powell in Wolman observed: 'The
risk of significant religious or denominational control over our democratic
processes-or even of deep political division along religious lines-is remote,
and when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, any
such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing oversight of this
Court." 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977).
96. Section II of the Wolman opinion consisted of a summary of the three-part
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Thus, the stage was set for the Court's review of state aid to
parents of parochial school children in the form of tax deductions
for educational expenses.
III THE MUELLER DECISION
A. Lower Court Opinions
Individual Minnesota taxpayers filed suit in federal district
court 97 challenging the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute98
which authorized state taxpayers to deduct expenditures for their
dependents' tuition,99 textbooksOO and transportation.O' The
establishment clause test; yet, this three paragraph portion of the opinion
gained the adherance of only four Justices-Blackman, Burger, Powell and
Stewart. 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977). Both Justice Stevens and Justice Bren-
nan dissented from this section of the opinion, while the remaining Justices
failed to join in it. Such reservations about the three-part test indicate the
serious instability of the historical establishment clause doctrine.
97. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981).
98. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). Section 209.09(22) authorizes the following
deductions from gross income in computing net income:
Tutition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to
others, not to exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and
$700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and
transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary or sec-
ondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill
the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall
mean and include books and other instructional materials and equip-
ment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only
those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary
and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instruc-
tional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets,
doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such ten-
ets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials
for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities including sporting
events, musical or dramatic events, speech activities, driver's educa-
tion, or programs of a similar nature.
Id.
99. The district court determined that "tuition," under the Minnesota statute, in-
cluded: tuition in the ordinary sense; tuition to public school students who
attend public schools outside their residence school districts; tuition for slow
learner private tutoring services; tuition for students who are physically un-
able to attend classes; tuition charged by private schools or tutors if the in-
struction is acceptable for elementary or secondary school credit; Montessori
School tuition for grades K through 12; and tuition for driver education when
it is part of the school curriculum. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D.
Minn. 1981).
100. The district court concluded that "textbook" deductions included not only
secular textbooks but also other school related equipment, including: (1) the
cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education, (2) camera rental
fees paid to the school for photography classes, (3) rental fees paid to the
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challengers asserted that the statute advanced the establishment
of religion and restrained the free exercise of religion. 0 2 The dis-
trict court concluded that an earlier action'0 3 against the same stat-
ute was dispositive regarding the secular purpose and
entanglement prongs of the three-part test; still, the court agreed
that new statistical evidence relating to the statute's "primary ef-
fect" warranted a new analysis of the enactment. 0 4The challeng-
ers introduced statistical data from the Minnesota Department of
Education showing that ninety-six percent of the pupils attending
nonpublic schools were attending sectarian schools. Thus, argued
the challengers, the statute failed the establishment clause stan-
dards since the tax was directed at, and had the primary effect of,
advancing religion.105
The district court found that the statistical evidence regarding
the statute's primary effect "lack[ed] credibility by reason of omis-
sions of serious significance," 0 6 and concluded that the facially
neutral statute was also neutral in its application since it neither
advanced nor inhibited religion. In granting summary judgment
for the defendants, the court relied heavily on factors established
in Walz v. Tax Commission: absence of direct financial aid to the
religious institutions, 0 7 absence of direct subsidy of any religious
activity, 0 8 and the remote nature of the benefit as a deduction
school for ice skates, (4) calculator rental fees paid to the school for mathe-
matics classes, (5) expenses for home economic materials needed for mini-
mum requirements, (6) expenses for special metal or wood to meet minimum
shop class requirements, (7) costs of art supplies need to meet minimum re-
quirements, (8) rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments, and
(9) the cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class. Id.
101. The district court defined "transportation" to include the cost of transporting
students in school districts that do not provide free transportation, the cost of
transporting students who live in one district but attend school in another,
and the cost of transporting students who attend school in their residence
district but who do not qualify for free transportation because of proximity to
their schools of attendance. Id.
102. The free exercise argument was dismissed by the court for failure to allege
the manner in which religious beliefs had been infringed. Id. at 1003.
103. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
104. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1001. (D. Minn. 1981).
105. Id.
106. The challengers had argued that the statute provided, at most, only fourteen
to eighteen percent of the tax relief benefits to taxpayers who use the public
school system. Id. at 1002. The defendants countered that the statistics used
by the challengers were based only on full-time tuition payments and ignored
items such as tuition for summer school and tuition for other courses like
driver's education. Additionally, the defendants contended that the chal-
lenger's evidence failed to include over two million dollars in tuition ex-
penses paid to public schools. Id.
107. Id. at 1000.
108. Id.
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rather than a credit.109 The court found that the availability of tax
relief to all parents was of critical importance since "a law does not
advance religion when its benefits are neutrally and widely distrib-
uted and from which religious institutions benefit only incidently
and indirectly.""o
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court."' The court of appeals applied
the three-part establishment clause test but, like the district court,
concentrated on the "primary effect" of the statute." 2 State aid in
the form of a deduction for transportation expenses was upheld
under the authority of Everson v. Board of Education.113 The text-
book deduction was upheld as falling within the constitutional pro-
tection of Board of Education v. Allen, 4 while the permitted
deduction for instructional material and equipment was distin-
guished from that which was invalidated in Wolman v. Walter."l5
The court upheld the tuition deduction by distinguishing the stat-
ute in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist" 6 on two grounds. First, the statute in Nyquist operated as a
tax credit, not as a "genuine tax deduction."-7 Second, the Minne-
sota statute did not limit tax benefits to the parents of private
school students, in contrast to the statute in Nyquist, but benefited
a "broad class of parents with dependents in both public and non-
109. Id. at 1002.
110. Id.
111. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982).
112. The court found that the secular legislative purpose requirement was satis-
fied since the "manifest purpose of the challenged statute is to provide all
taxpayers a benefit which will operate to enhance the quality of education in
both public and private schools." Id. at 1198. Only brief mention was made of
the "entanglement" criterion in limited reference to the textbook aid. The
circuit court simply restated the district court's conclusion that potential for
entanglement was lessened by the fact that the primary enforcement tool
would be an audit of an individual taxpayer, not an in-depth analysis of a
school's religious function. Id. at 1202.
113. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
114. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
115. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. The court
distinguished Wolman by observing that the Ohio statute had involved mas-
sive loans of instructional material directly to the school, while the Minne-
sota statute involved deductions permitted for the parents. Mueller v. Allen,
676 F.2d 1195, 1201 (8th Cir. 1982). 'The difficulties regarding the Establish-
ment Clause evident in ... massive loan progr~ms are much different than
those in the instant case where the effect of a possible tax deduction for the
purchase of defined secular school materials is much more indirect." Id. at
1202.
116. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
117. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790 n.49
(1973).
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public schools."118 The court reasoned that the breadth of the ben-
efited class, evident on the face of the statute, supported the
conclusion that "the Minnesota statute has not singled out a class
of citizens for a special economic benefit."119 In spite of statistical
evidence which indicated that "the greater number of the class
benefited are parents of church school children," the court found
that there were "substantial benefits flowing to all members of the
public."120 The court acknowledged that the statute "bestow[ed]
some benefit to church-affiliated schools,"12 1 but found that such
"benefit to religion or involvement between church and state is so
remote and incidental that the challenged deduction does not vio-
late the constitutional wall separating church and state."
22
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Mueller, and that of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg.12 3
The Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Mueller
and upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute.l2 4
Writing the opinion for a 5-4 majority,125 Justice Rehnquist first
acknowledged the difficulty in interpreting and applying the estab-
lishment clause, particularly with regard to government programs
of financial aid to sectarian schools or to parents of children at-
tending secular schools. Justice Rehnquist restated the familiar
three-part test but qualified the use of the test by emphasizing that
"it provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Es-
tablishment Clause challenges." 2 6
118. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1203 (8th Cir. 1982).
119. Id. at 1204.
120. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 1206.
123. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980). In Norberg the First Circuit applied the three-part
establishment clause test to a Rhode Island statute which was nearly identi-
cal to the Minnesota statute. In finding the Rhode Island statute unconstitu-
tional, the court relied heavily on statistical evidence demonstrating that the
tax benefit favored the ninety-four percent of nonpublic students who at-
tended sectarian schools. The court concluded that the primary effect of the
Rhode Island statute was to aid religion. Id. at 860.
124. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
125. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined Justice
Rehnquist in upholding the Minnesota statute. Justice Marshall filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.
126. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 741 (1973)).
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The question of secular legislative purpose was promptly re-
solved. The Court found that defraying the cost of educational ex-
penses, whether incurred at private or public schools, was a
legislative purpose that was "both secular and understandable, ' 12
7
since the overall objective of such aid was "ensuring that the
state's citizenry is well-educated."128
The majority devoted much of its attention to evaluating the
Minnesota statute's effect on advancing the sectarian aims of non-
public schools. After observing that state tax statutes are "entitled
to substantial deference,"129 the Court identified several factors
which supported a finding that the Minnesota statute was constitu-
tional. First, the deduction was "available for educational ex-
penses incurred by all parents."130 Second, by channeling
whatever assistance may be provided to parochial schools through
individual parents, establishment clause objections were 're-
duced."' 3 ' Third, private educational institutions make special
contributions to society,132 and the tax relief provided to parents
sending their children to parochial schools "can be fairly regarded
as a rough return for the benefits."'33 Finally, the Court bluntly
refused to consider statistical evidence of which citizens benefited
under the law. 3 4
The majority dismissed the entanglement criterion in a para-
graph, concluding that the involvement of the state in determining
whether particular books and instructional material were secular,
and therefore eligible for the tax deduction, did not differ from the
decisions and involvement approved in Board of Education v.
127. Id. at 3067.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Court distinguished Nyquist in a footnote by stating that there was
considerable doubt as to whether the "tax benefits" provided by New York
law in Nyquist could be properly regarded as parts of a genuine system of tax
laws. Id. at 307 n.6.
130. Id. at 3068 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that the assistance pro-
gram in Nyquist involved tuition grants which were provided only to children
in nonpublic schools.
131. Id. at 3069. The Court found that when public funds became available only as
a result of private choices of individual parents, the resulting benefits to paro-
chial schools were "attenuated" and posed no risk of government involve-
ment which would cause political strife along religious lines. Id. at 3070.
Further, channeling such aid through parents was found to avoid any "impri-
matur of State approval." Id.
132. Id. at 3070. The Court quoted from Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
Wolman. See supra note 95.
133. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3070 (1983).
134. Id. The Court stated that relying on annual statistics to judge the constitu-
tionality of a facially neutral law "would scarcely provide the certainty that
this field stands in need of nor can we perceive principled standards by
which such statistical evidence might be evaluated." Id.
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2. The Dissenting Opinion
The principal position of the dissenting Justices in Mueller was
that the establishment clause prohibits any subsidy of religious
education, directly or indirectly. According to the dissent, the Min-
nesota statute was unconstitutional for the same reason that the
New York statute was struck down in Committee for Public Educa-
tion & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist:136 it had the "direct and im-
mediate effect of advancing religion."137 The dissent cited Nyquist
for the proposition that the controlling consideration should not be
the form of the aid (tax credit or tax deduction); instead, the focus
should be on the "substantive impact" of the financial aid.138 Re-
sponding to the majority's attempt to distinguish Nyquist, the dis-
sent disagreed with each of the majority's findings. The dissenters
argued that the deduction was not effectively available to all par-
ents,139 the statistical evidence of primary effect should not be ig-
nored, 40 the form of the tax benefit was not controlling,' 4' and
135. Id. at 3071. In a footnote the Court suggested that the "political divisiveness"
aspect of the entanglement inquiry should be limited to cases where direct
financial assistance is provided to parochial schools or teachers in parochial
schools. Id at 3071 n.11.
136. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
137. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39
(1973).
138. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3073 (1983).
139. Justice Marshall conceded that parents of public school children could take
deductions for non-tuition expenses, such as gym clothes, pencils and note-
books, but found that such deductible expenses were de minimus in compari-
son to the tuition expenses deductible by parents of private school children.
That the Minnesota statute makes some small benefit available to all
parents cannot alter the fact that the most substantial benefit pro-
vided by the statute is available only to those parents who send their
children to schools that charge tuition.... The statute is little more
than a subsidy of tuition masquerading as a subsidy of general edu-
cational expenses.
Id. at 3074.
140. The dissent referred to the decisions in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973), to support the position that statistical evidence should be considered
regarding the extent to which parents sending their children to sectarian
schools benefited from the statute. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3074-75
(1983).
141. While the majority had concluded that the Minnesota statute was a "genuine
tax deduction," Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068 n.6 (1983), and had char-
acterized the scheme in Nyquist as a tax credit, the dissent found this to be
"a distinction without a difference." Id. at 3075. The dissent reasoned that
the economic consequence of either program was the same: to grant a tax
benefit "in exchange for performing a specific act which the state desires to
encourage"-attendance at private schools. Id. at 3076.
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neither Board of Education v. Allen nor Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation were applicable precedent.142
Although the majority failed to differentiate the various types of
deductions available under the Minnesota statute, the dissent spe-
cifically considered the deduction for textbooks and instructional
materials.143 The dissent primarily complained that the textbook/
instructional materials deduction was not restricted to the secular
functions of the parochial schools,'" and argued that the statute
provided substantial aid to the educational function of the church-
affilated schools which "necessarily result[ed] in aid to the sectar-
ian school enterprise as a whole."145 According to the dissent, the
Court's decision in Mueller was 'flatly at odds with the fundamen-
tal principle that a state may provide no financial support whatso-
ever to promote religion."'4 6
142. The dissent found both Allen and Everson to be inapposite, since those cases
involved indirect and incidental benefits which were carefully restricted to
the secular side of the church-related schools, whereas the tuition deductions
authorized in the Minnesota statute were not similarly restricted. Id. at 3076.
143. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion mentioned the transportation
deduction, an apparently uncontested portion of the Minnesota statute. See
Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1201 (8th Cir. 1981) ("No one seriously chal-
lenges the transportation deduction.") In Norberg the transportation deduc-
tion was found constitutional, but the court concluded that it could not be
severed from the unconstitutional portions of the statute. Rhode Island
Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F,2d 855, 862 (1st Cir. 1980).
144. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3077 (1983). The dissent cited Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), for the proposition that even neutral, completely
secular instructional material furnished to church-affiliated schools contrib-
utes to religious instruction because the religious mission is the only reason
for the school's existence. Id. at 366. Wolman was cited by the dissent as
supporting a similar conclusion regarding aid furnished to the student or his
parent rather than directly to the schools. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
249-50 (1977).
Regarding the textbook deduction, the dissent criticized the majority's re-
liance on Board ofEduc. v. Allen, a decision in which the Court assumed the
textbooks would only be used for secular education because the books had
been selected by the state for use in the public schools. The dissent reasoned
that, since the Minnesota statute did not limit the deduction to state-ap-
proved books (those used in public schools), the statute would impermissibly
allow parochial schools to choose the textbooks to be purchased by parents.
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3077 (1983). This conclusion was bolstered by
the fact that other Minnesota statutes, Mn'N. STAT. §§ 123.932, 123.933, author-
ize the state to loan to private schools textbooks used in public schools.
Therefore, parents would have no need to purchase and claim a deduction for
such books.
145. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3078 (1983) (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. at 366).
146. Id.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
IV. ANALYSIS
The decision in Mueller suggests that important changes have
been made in the three-part establishment clause test as it is ap-
plied to the issue of state aid to parochial schools. Both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions gave only fleeting consideration to the
secular purpose criterion.147 It is likely that the secular purpose
prong of the three-part test will continue to be only minimally re-
strictive on state legislation aiding private schools. 4 8 The decision
in Mueller reaffirms the familiar principle that an unconstitutional
motive will not be attributed to a state enactment challenged
under the establishment clause, especially where a plausible secu-
lar purpose is evident on the face of the statute.149
Furthermore, the decision in Mueller signals a retreat from a
vigorous application of the excessive entanglement prong of the
establishment clause test. 5 0 The Court found that administrative
147. The secular purpose requirement is a low-threshold test, since the courts will
usually find in the statutory language or in the nature of the enacted program
a secular purpose. At least one commentator has suggested that the secular
legislative purpose requirement completely lacks substance as a constitu-
tional test, arguing that it is merely a "judicial rite" consisting of a "verbal
formula hurriedly mumbled." Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian
Schools: A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REv. 783, 820 (1978).
148. The Court in Mueller was consistent with precedent in deciding that state
legislatures have a legitimate secular interest and purpose in promoting plu-
ralism and diversity among public and private schools, creating a healthy and
safe educational environment, and protecting already overburdened public
school systems against an influx of private school students should they de-
cide to abandon private school in favor of public schools. See, e.g., Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
149. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
150. The development and application of the excessive entanglement inquiry has
sparked considerable discussions regarding the validity and usefulness of
this element of the establishment clause test. Much of the commentary has
been critical of this criterion because of the weak historical grounds for the
political divisiveness inquiry and because of the inconsistent application of
the test. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 44, at 273 ("IT] o make 'divisiveness'
determinative of constitutionality, despite the secular nature of the govern-
mental program in controversy, is neither a desirable or workable approach
to the problem" in view of the considerable and valid political involvement of
churches and religious groups in national and state legislation on matters
such as gambling, marriage, abortion, integration, divorce, birth control and
prohibition.); Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The En-
tanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, ST. Louis
U.L.J. 205, 212-24, 232 (1980) (The political entanglement test ought to be
abandoned because of weak historical basis for its application, and because
its use endangers the important civil liberty of citizens' full participation in
political decision-making.); Kurland, supra note 15, at 19-20 ("[The entangle-
ment criterion] is either empty or nonsensical .... The word entanglement
is only an antonym for separation. The former assures no more guidance
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entanglement did not arise from the state's determination of eligi-
ble textbooks.15l However, the validity of this conclusion is seri-
ously weakened by Rehnquist's reliance on the questionable
precedent of Board of Education v. Allen. 5 2 The Court's sugges-
tion, that the "political divisiveness" inquiry be limited to "cases
where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to
teachers in parochial schools,"' 5 3 represents an attempt to avoid
any significant use of this inquiry. In fact, the "political divisive-
ness" inquiry is most appropriate in cases such as Mueller where
the provision of direct aid to parents created serious risks of polit-
ical division along religious lines.l54
than the latter... ."); Nowak, The Supreme Cour the Religion Clauses and
the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 883, 906 (1976) (The appli-
cation of the political divisiveness test is "unprincipled and futile."); Schot-
ten, supra note 25, at 235 (Because of inconsistent application, the excessive
entanglement criterion is "more a piece of putty than a yardstick.")
However, excessive entanglement has been praised by other commenta-
tors as a valid and useful establishment clause inquiry. See, e.g., Buchanan,
supra note 147, at 821 (The excessive entanglement criterion is "the most
credible guiding principle" of the three-part test since the primary effect ele-
ment lacks "desirable specificity" and is "more conclusion of law than guid-
ig principle."); Shortt, The Establishment Clause and Religion-Based
Categories: Taking Entanglement Seriously, 10 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 145,
182-84 (1982) (Proper application of the entanglement test to prohibit the cre-
ation and use of religion-based categories would provide a principled basis
for deciding cases under the establishment clause and would advance the
values of separation and neutrality.).
151. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 (1983). It is significant that the majority
in Mueller did not apply the secular purpose or primary effect tests to the
textbook deduction. Doing so would have required that the Court confront a
difficult issue raised by the dissent. Id. at 3077. Since other Minnesota stat-
utes, MN. STAT. §§ 123.932 & 123.933 (1982), authorize the state to provide
textbooks used in public schools to nonpublic school students, the only rea-
son for parents to purchase books deductible under § 290.09(22) would be to
acquire books chosen by the parochial schools. MiNN. STAT. § 290.09(22)
(1982). Thus, § 290.09(22) has indicia of both non-secular purpose and a pri-
mary effect which advances religion. Id.
152. See supra note 91. The Court observed in Wolman that the Allen decision
regarding textbooks was being followed simply as a matter of stare decisis.
See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977). In an earlier opinion,
three Justices indicated that Allen might be decided differently today under
the entanglement prong of the establishment test, a criterion which was not
applied by the Court when Allen was decided. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
378 (1975) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, J.J., concurring and
dissenting).
153. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n.11 (1983).
154. Political campaigns to raise or lower the amount of indirect state aid to reli-
gious schools (such as tuition tax deductions) can generate significant polit-
ical strife along religious lines, creating no less social disturbance than strife
resulting from direct administrative confrontations.
A number of commentators have suggested that denying state aid to pri-
vate religious schools is not likely to mitigate political strife along religious
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The Mueller decision rested primarily on an analysis of whether
the Minnesota statute had "the primary effect of advancing the
sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools."155 The majority concen-
trated on four characteristics of the Minnesota tax deduction in
concluding that the establishment clause was not violated. First,
the Court noted that the deduction under the Minnesota statute
was only one of many deductions allowable under Minnesota tax
laws. 56 The significance of this fact was overstated, however, since
the deference given to state legislatures in creating classifications
lines, but would merely shift the source of controversy. It is contended that
the denial of aid would cause those in favor of parochial school aid to actively
press for favorable legislation, or to oppose governmental aid programs for
public schools, in an attempt to equalize a perceived funding imbalance.
Both responses would create political strife along religious lines. See, e.g.,
Choper, supra note 44, at 273; Morgan, supra note 16, at 96; Nowak, supra note
150, at 907; Schwarz, infra note 208, at 711.
Although this is a compelling argument, at least one commentator has
suggested that a "no aid" approach would engender less political strife over
time, since there would be little incentive for religious groups to press the
legislature for new or renewed funding appropriations. "Blocked by a potent
constitutional barrier, the proponents of governmental aid to sectarian
schools would come to recognize the futility of roiling the political waters;
their enthusiasm for political battle would wane appreciably as they came to
realize that the keys to the public treasury were beyond their grasp."
Buchanan, supra note 147, at 834.
155. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 (1983) (quoting Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980)).
156. Id. The Court cited § 290.09(10), MiNN. STAT. § 290.09(10) (1982) (deductions
for medical expenses), and § 290.21, Mwm. STAT. § 290.21(1982) (deduction for
charitable contributions). In a footnote, the court added § 272.02 (exemptions
from property tax for property used for religious purposes) and stated that
the holding in Walz v. Tax Comm'n "does not require the conclusion that
such provisions of a state's tax law violate the Establishment Clause." Muel-
ler v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 n.5 (1983). This is an imaginative interpreta-
tion of Walz since the holding in Walz was expressly limited to tax
exemptions and cannot reasonably be read as an approval of charitable de-
ductions. Moreover, federal courts have never found tuition payments to
schools to be classified as charitable contributions. See, e.g., Oppewal v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972) (payment to religious school at-
tended by taxpayer's children not deductible). The Internal Revenue Service
will disallow any contribution to a qualified charitable institution to the ex-
tent that it is offset by the fair market value of services received from the
institution. The I.R.S. has interpreted § 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
(defining charitable contribution) as follows:
[I]t is immaterial that the payments.., were not explicitly desig-
nated as tuition . . . However the payment is designated, and
whatever the taxpayer's motive in making it, the test to be applied is
whether the payment was, to any substantial extent, offset by the fair
market value of services rendered to the taxpayer in the nature of
tuition. If so, the payment, to the extent of the offset, should be re-
garded as non-deductible tuition.
Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108-09.
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in tax statutes does not immunize a tax scheme which violates the
establishment clause. 5 7 Moreover, the Court's grant of "substan-
tial deference"' 5 8 to the Minnesota legislature's judgment is prop-
erly a secular purpose consideration, not part of the primary
effects analysis.159
Second, the majority placed considerable emphasis on the fact
that the Minnesota deduction was "available" for "all parents, in-
cluding those whose children attend public schools.'
60 In distin-
guishing Nyquist, where public assistance was provided only to
parents of children in private schools, the Court in Mueller recal-
led that the question of the validity of state aid "made available
generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefited" had not been de-
cided in Nyquist.161 Mueller, however, is clearly not a case where
aid was provided without regard to the nature of the institution
benefited; the Court explicitly recognized that the purpose of the
aid was to "[assure] the continued financial health of private
schools."1
6 2
Although the Court properly stated that a program which "neu-
trally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens"
does not violate the establishment clause, 63 this conclusion is not
157. See, e.g., Byrne v. Public Funds for Pub. Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1979), afg 590
F.2d 514, 520 n.11 (3rd Cir. 1979) (striking down program of tax deductions);
Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), affig 353 F. Supp. 744, 767 (S.D. Ohio
1972) (striking down a program of tax credits).
158. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 (1983).
159. Under the secular purpose analysis it is appropriate to defer to the legisla-
ture's judgment, expressed or implicit in the enactment. See supra notes 47 &
147. However, prior to Mueller no such deference was due under the primary
effect test. As the Court noted in Nyquist, "the propriety of a legislature's
purpose may not immunize from further scrutiny a law which either has a
primary effect that advances religion, or which fosters excessive entangle-
ments between Church and State." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973). Even a law found to have a pri-
mary effect which "promote[s] some legitimate end under the State's police
power is [not] immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also
has the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion." Id. at 783 n.39
(emphasis added).
160. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068 (1983).
161. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 n.38
(1973).
162. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 (1983) (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 3068. The Court relied on Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), and
"other decisions" for this proposition. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068
(1983). However, Widmar clearly focused on the actual (not facial) availabil-
ity of state assistance to a "broad class of non-religious as well as religious
[beneficiaries]." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). The Court in
Widmar explicitly noted that "[t] he provision of benefits to so broad a spec-
trum of groups is an important index of secular effect," but only "in the ab-
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applicable to the facts of Mueller for two reasons. First, although
the statute is facially neutral to all parents, in application the bene-
fit is clearly targeted to parents of children attending private
schools.164 Therefore, the requirement of neutrality was not satis-
fied. Second, the state assistance is neither broadly "available,"
nor "provided," to all parents, since the bulk of the tax benefits are
conferred upon parents whose children attend religious schools.165
The Court in Mueller ignored the essential inquiry of the pri-
mary effect test, focusing instead on the facial neutrality of the
statute without regard to contradictory empirical evidence of the
statute's effect.166 Whereas previous establishment clause deci-
sions had recognized the relationship between the state aid pro-
gram and the extent of benefits conferred upon the parochial
school or parents whose children attend parochial schools,167 the
Mueller Court retreated from any inquiry into the composition of
the benefited class.168 Justice Rehnquist cited two reasons for
avoiding reliance on "statistical analysis" of the benefited class:
first, the lack of certainty needed for establishment clause ques-
tions;169 and, second, the absence of "principled standards" by
sence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate [the state
assistance]." Id. at 275(emphasis added).
164. The Court acknowledged the stipulated facts that 820,000 students in Minne-
sota attended public elementary and secondary while 91,000 attended private
elementary and secondary schools. About ninety-five percent of these pri-
vate school students attended religious schools. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct.
3062, 3064-65 (1983). The dissent pointed out that only seventy-nine students
attending public schools were charged tuition for out-of-district attendance.
The balance of the public school students were charged no tuition. Id. at
3072.
165. The challengers of the statute contended that the State of Minnesota loses 2.4
million dollars in annual revenue from the tuition deduction and that sev-
enty-one percent of the amount is given to parents with dependent children
in religious schools, a group comprising less than ten percent of the total ele-
mentary and secondary school enrollment. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195,
1198-99 (8th Cir. 1981).
166. As noted by the Court in Nyquist, the establishment clause requirement of
neutrality is infringed by special tax benefits: "[I]nsofar as such benefits
render assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian schools,
their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious in-
stitutions." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 793 (1973). By refusing to acknowledge the characteristics of the bene-
fited class of parents, the Court avoided finding such inevitable effect.
167. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973) (recognition that over ninety
percent of the children attending private schools in Pennsylvania were en-
rolled in religious schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973) (recognition that over eighty-five percent of
the private schools benefited under the New York statute were church-
affiliated).
168. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3070 (1983).
169. Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of the "lack of certainty" argument is
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which the empirical evidence could be evaluated.170 In fact, reli-
ance on detailed statistical evidence regarding classifications of aid
and classes of persons benefited would be superfluous since the
only inquiry needed is a general one: whether the tax benefit for
educational expenses primarily benefits parents who send their
children to religious schools.171 Since over ninety-five percent of
all private school students in Minnesota attend sectarian schools,
finding a primary effect of advancing religion should be clear and
direct where the aid has not been effectively restricted to secular
functions.172
Although not a major consideration of the majority in Mueller,
the Court attempted to create a distinction between the Minnesota
tax relief as a "genuine tax deduction,"173 and the New York
scheme of "tax benefits" struck down in Committee for Public Edu-
cation and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.174 As the dissent in Muel-
the implicit recognition that the Court's decisions in establishment clause
cases have become virtually impossible to predict. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text. It is difficult to accept the Court's contention that a pri-
mary effect analysis under the establishment clause, aided by the use of sta-
tistical evidence regarding the benefited class, lacks any more certainty than
the standards of "disproportionate impact" and "discriminatory motive" in
cases under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
170. This argument, like the "lack of certainty" contention, is unconvincing. The
obvious conclusion to be drawn from statistical data (showing that seventy-
one percent of the benefits are flowing to religious school attendees constitut-
ing only ten percent of the state's total enrollment) is that the funds are not
being used "exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes."
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780
(1973). The Court's concern that a "statistical analysis" might be misleading
because it would fail to account for persons "entitled" to tax relief who fail to
claim the deductions is an unwarranted concern. It is well established that
the primary effect analysis focuses on the class of actual beneficiaries, not on
those who might benefit from the state assistance. See supra note 167 and
accompanying text.
171. See supra note 166.
172. Everson andAllen are the only prior Supreme Court cases in which the bene-
fits were facially available to all parents and students. However, the Court
subsequently distinguished these cases from aid in the form of tuition reim-
bursement which is "quite unlike the sort of 'indirect' and 'incidental' bene-
fits that flowed to sectarian schools from programs aiding all parents by
supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks for their children. Such
benefits were carefully restricted to the purely secular side of church-affiliated
institutions. . . ." Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (emphasis added).
173. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 n.6 (1983) (quoting Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790 n.49).
174. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790-91
(1973). In Nyquist, the challengers of the statute contended that the statute
established a system of tax "credits," id. at 789, while the state contended
that the statute created tax "modifications." Id. The Court found that, in ef-
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ler observed: "This is a distinction without a difference."175 Even
the majority in Mueller conceded that the economic consequences
of the programs in Nyquist and Mueller were the same, 7 6 thereby
considerably weakening this argument which improperly elevated
form over substance.
A fourth factor cited by the Mueller Court, was that providing
aid directly to parents, not directly to the sectarian schools, con-
tributed to the statute's validity because any aid to religious
schools would result only from "numerous, private choices of indi-
vidual parents."177 Yet the Court failed to reconcile this conclu-
sion with its warning in Nyquist that "if the grants are offered as a
incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools by
making unrestricted cash payments to them, the Establishment
Clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventual-
ly find their way into the sectarian institutions." 7 8 The Court in
Nyquist had also concluded that channeling the aid through par-
ents did not provide a "per se immunity from examination of the
substance of the State's program," 7 9 as the aid in that case was
found to be advancement of religion.
Perhaps the most revealing portion of Rehnquist's primary ef-
fect analysis dealt with the indirect nature of the assistance pro-
vided by the Minnesota program. Justice Rehnquist observed that
the main thrust of the establishment clause was to prevent govern-
ment involvement in religion which is likely to lead to severe polit-
ical strife. 80 Thus, Justice Rehnquist introduced the notion of
fect, the statute created a tax credit, but noted that the constitutionality of
the tax benefit "does not turn in any event on the label we accord it." Id.
175. 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3075 (1983).
176. Id. at 3067 n.6.
177. 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983).
178. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786
(1983). On the same day as the decision in Nyquist, the Court summarily
affirmed an Ohio district court decision which struck down a tax credit for
tuition expenses. The lower court had reasoned that channeling the aid
through parents did not avoid the primary effect of advancing religion:
Such aid may be less direct and less capable of precise measurement
than a grant to the schools themselves; yet if some parents will now
be able to send their children to these schools or if fewer parents
already utilizing them will be forced to withdraw their children, [the
schools] will be aided.
Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affid mem. sub
nom Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
179. 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973). The Court in Nyquist made clear that delivering
grants to parents rather than to the schools was not conclusive regarding the
primary effect of the aid but was "only one among many factors to be consid-
ered." Id.
180. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983). The contention that avoidance of
political strife along religious lines is a primary evil targeted by the establish-
ment clause is a weak constitutional proposition. The contention lacks his-
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political entanglement into the primary effect analysis, and con-
cluded that the risk of serious political division along religious
lines is remote.181 This conclusion stressed the issue of political
strife, thus avoiding the otherwise obvious finding that the
.financial assistance given to parents had the same ultimate effect
as aid given directly to the schools-the advancement of religion.
This approach to the primary effect analysis reveals the Court's
reluctance to adopt the permeation doctrine182 regarding aid to pa-
rochial schools, and indicates that the potential danger of political
strife resulting from state aid will be viewed as remote so long as
the aid is provided indirectly.
The majority in Mueller appears to be willing to abandon the
traditional three-part establishment clause test for evaluating
state aid to parochial schools in favor of a "factor analysis" ap-
proach. 183 The "factor analysis" approach weighs the risk of harm
to establishment clause values against the positive social contribu-
tions made by private sectarian schools. The Court justified this
balancing process as being necessary to relieve parents of paro-
chial school children from the "particularly great financial burden
[which they bear] in educating their children."184 Further, the
torical support and threatens public participation in the democratic process.
See supra notes 74-75 & 150 and accompanying text.
181. Paradoxically, the Court cited Justice Powell's opinion in Wolman to support
the proposition that the threat of government intrusion into religious life is
remote. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
182. The permeation doctrine was acknowledged by the Court in Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). "Even though earmarked for secular purposes,
'when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a sub-
stantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state
aid has the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion." Id. at 365-66
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
183. The Court's application of the three-part establishment clause test has in-
volved consideration of a number of diverse factors including- whether the
state's purpose is religious or secular the relative importance of this public
purpose; the likelihood of achieving the purpose; the type and amount of aid
given to religion; the proportion of secular functions within the religious insti-
tution; the relationship between the aid and the religious functions of the in-
stitution; the involvement of the state in selecting the benefited institutions;
and the existence and adequacy of alternative means of assistance. See
Choper, supra note 44, at 324.
184. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3070 (1983). The argument that a system of
tax relief for private school tuition fairly equalizes the "benefit" of free public
education was raised by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in dis-
senting opinions in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 803, 812 (1973). The majority in Nyquist rejected this equality
argument, reasoning that all students have equal access to public schools "to-
tally at state expense," id at 782 n.38, and that granting an extra benefit to
private school students could lead to "complete subsidization of all religious
schools... -a result wholly at variance with the Establishment Clause." Id.
(emphasis in original).
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Court argued that "whatever unequal effect may be attributed to
the statutory classification can be fairly regarded as a rough return
for the benefits... provided to the state and all taxpayers by par-
ents sending their children to parochial schools."185 However, a
utilitarian weighing of various social benefits against the establish-
ment clause may lead to legislative encroachments on both separa-
tism and religious liberty. Prior to Mueller, recognition of the
social value of private and sectarian educational institutions was
never sufficient to validate aid which was not restricted to a secu-
lar purpose.186 Now the "special contributions" of parochial
schools apparently can be used to overcome objections that the
aid's ultimate effect is the establishment/advancement of religion.
The Court's inability to define clear and consistent principles
for application of the establishment clause to cases involving state
aid to parochial schools stems in part from a failure to develop a
proper definition of the values served by the religion clauses of the
first amendment. The majority's allegiance to a mechanical pur-
pose-effect-entanglement test, or reliance upon a balancing of so-
cial interests, without properly focusing on the purposes to be
served by both religion clauses, necessarily results in decisions
which lack constitutional guidance for state legislatures and others
interested in aid to parochial schools.187
Although commentators have often suggested that religious lib-
erty is the central purpose served by the religion clauses, 188 the
Court's analyses of aid to private schools have generally failed to
define and balance the often conflicting purposes of the establish-
ment clause and the free exercise clause.189 In Mueller, this failure
was repeated. The Court avoided any direct reliance on the free
exercise clause as the provision which promotes voluntarism and
185. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3070 (1983). However, even if this is a secular
legislative purpose of the statute it will not immunize the aid under the pri-
mary effect analysis. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., P. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTrUTiONAL LmERTY 129 (1956); P.
KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrruTiON 77 (1964) [hereinafter cited as RELI-
GION]; Choper, supra note 44, at 267. For a comprehensive analysis of the
problems of defining and protecting religion and religious liberty in the con-
text of contemporary religious pluralism, see RELIGION, supra at 13-14.
189. An exception is the decision in Waz v. Tax Comm'n, which has been referred
to as "the paradigm of balancing" between the separation value of the estab-
lishment clause and the neutrality value of the free exercise clause. Note,
supra note 22, at 710. In Walz the Court noted that the first amendment pro-
hibited either "governmentally established religion" or "governmental inter-
ference with religion." 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). "Short of those expressly
proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist with-
out sponsorship and without interference." Id.
[Vol. 63:572
TUITION TAX DEDUCTIONS
neutrality required for the effective exercise of religious liberty.190
Were the Court to adopt an approach for balancing the establish-
ment clause's principle of separation against the free exercise
clause's principle of neutrality,191 the primary focus would be
whether the state has properly relieved the burdens created by
tax-supported public school financing192 without creating an undue
danger of church-state involvement.193 The majority in Mueller did
impliedly use this notion of "benevolent neutrality"' 94 (i.e., avoid-
ance of hostility toward religion), but based its decision on general
concepts of social equalization and rewarding social contribution,
rather than a more appropriate constitutional balancing of the two
religion clauses. In short, the Court's decisions in establishment
clause cases lack effective definition and application of the pur-
poses and values inherent in the religion clauses.
Clear evidence of the Court's uncertainty about which evils the
establishment clause was designed to prevent exists in Mueller.
Justice Rehnquist cited Nyquist for the proposition that the pur-
pose of the establishment clause was to prevent ". . . government
involvement in religious life";195 yet, in the next sentence Rehn-
quist quoted Wolman v. Walter to define the historic purpose of
the establishment clause as being to deminish "the risk of signifi-
cant religious or denominational control over our democratic
processes."'9 6
The significance of Mueller for future programs of state aid to
parochial schools can hardly be underestimated. The Court has
departed sharply from precedent by upholding state aid which is
channeled through parents, despite the fact that it primarily bene-
190. See Note, supra note 21.
191. Several commentators have already proposed such a balance. See, e.g., P.
KAUPER, supra note 188, at 130-33; Note, supra note 22; Young, supra note 15,
at 787-88.
192. Although the Court in Mueller seemed to agree with commentators who sug-
gest that pupils who choosrk-o attend free public schools actually receive a
state subsidy "in-kind," see;.g., Nowak, supra note 150, at 896, it is clear that
there is no "general principle that requires the state to compensate those
who out of religious conviction incur a handicap under law." Freund, supra
note 74, at 1687. Thus, in Mueller there existed no "burden" upon the free
exercise of religion because of tax-supported public schools. "If your religion
prevents you from availing yourself of the public facility and impels you to
make a financial sacrifice for the sake of your faith, surely the spirit of reli-
gion is the better served by your act." Id. See also supra note 184.
193. The establishment clause would be violated if the tax relief had the primary
effect of advancing religion, see supra note 47, or resulted in excessive entan-
glement of the state in religious affairs, see supra note 150.
194. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
195. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983).
196. Id. (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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fits parochial schools and is not limited to secular functions. This
holding was not a breach of the church-state wall of separation
compelled by the free exercise clause, since there was no conten-
tion that the absence of the tax deduction violated the principles of
voluntarism and neutrality.197 In effect, the Court in Mueller held
that a state may risk establishment of religion in order to compen-
sate parents who choose religious education for their children.198
Although Mueller-type aid to parochial schools does not di-
rectly establish a state religion, it is clearly legislation respecting
an establishment of religion. Chief Justice Burger emphasized in
Lemon v. Kurtzman that legislation which falls short of actually
establishing a religion may still violate the establishment clause:
"A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless
be one 'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that could
lead to such establishment and hence offend the First Amend-
ment."'199 Mueller-type aid favors religions which provide religious
education over those which do not (including non-religions), and,
thus, offends the neutrality principle of the establishment
clause.200 If Mueller marks the beginning of a significant accom-
modationist phase in aid to parochial schools, far-reaching adverse
results will inevitably follow. To the extent that religious institu-
197. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
198. This holding may be contrasted with the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist in Nyquist, where the balance
between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause was clearly
addressed: "In light of the free Exercise Clause ... [a] State should put no
unnecessary obstacles in the way of religious training for the young." Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 814 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting). The tax benefits in Nyquist were judged by Justice
Rehnquist to be "surely consistent with the 'benevolent neutrality' we try to
uphold in reconciling the tension between the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses." Id. at 810 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is possible that the
majority in Mueller chose to avoid the free exercise analysis in order to lend
support to the contention that the Minnesota aid was secular in purpose and
effect and would not significantly assist beneficiaries in the exercise of reli-
gious beliefs.
199. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
200. As of the 1980-1981 school year, 75.5 percent of all private sectarian elemen-
tary and secondary school students attended Catholic schools. NAT'L CENTER
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, UNrTED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 49 (1982). Religions which do not provide religious educational
functions necessarily receive no benefits from the tax relief measures. In the
Mueller type of aid "the government can express official approval or disap-
proval of certain religious practices and beliefs through its power either to
grant or withhold [tax relief] .... The assumption of this power constitutes
the most fundamental and obnoxious form of entanglement" Shortt, supra
note 150, at 156. As noted by the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952), the government's attitude toward religion should be one which
"shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."
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tions become dependent upon government assistance, religion will
risk loss of integrity and spiritual freedom. 20 '"The ultimate
strength of our religious establishment is derived... not from the
favoring acts of government, but, in largest measure, from the con-
tinuing force of the evangelical principle of separation." 202
Although some commentators have expressed concern that the
acceptance of government aid will result in government control of
parochial schools,203 this argument is weakened by the fact that
significant state control over private (including sectarian) schools
is often unrelated to a state's grant of financial aid.204 More serious
is the concern that granting aid for parochial school education will
have an adverse effect on the public school system. Diversity will
be lost as students of various faiths are attracted into separate
school systems. The enrollment and financial consequence of
widespread state adoption of tuition tax deductions could irrevers-
ibly imperil public support for the public education system.205
While it recognized the social value of private schools, the Mueller
Court failed to address these fundamental social concerns arising
from grants of government aid to parochial schools.
V. CONCLUSION
Options available to the Court for deciding establishment
clause cases are limited, especially with regard to grants of aid to
parochial schools. The "no-aid," or "absolutism," approach has
been properly rejected by the Court as resulting in impermissible
201. With the emphasis on religious liberty has come a recognition that the best
interests of both church and state are served when each is true to its own
functions. With regard to government aid and religious freedom one com-
mentator has said.
Religion is not true to itself if it depends upon governmental pre-
scription and coercion. The churches cannot look to the government
to perform their tasks. Some of the current discussions fail to recog-
nize that the churches are free only when they can depend upon
their own spiritual resources both in ministering to the lives of their
communicants and in bearing witness to this in the life of the
community.
RELIGION, supra note 188, at 82. This freedom is impaired when government
uses its coercive power to sanction religious faith.
202. M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11 (1965).
203. See, e.g., RELIGION, supra note 188, at 117; Rossmiller, FuLL STATE FuNDNG:
AN ANALYsis AN D CRmQUE, in CONST. REFORM OF SCH. FIN. 47 (K. Alexander
& K. Jordan ed. 1973); Buchanan, supra note 147, at 838; Hunter, The Continu-
ing Debate over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 523, 524 (1980).
204. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing the states'
authority to reasonably regulate public and private schools). See supra notes
32-33 and accompanying text.
205. See Buchanan, supra note 147, at 825-827.
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burdens on the free exercise of religion.206 Aid should be permit-
ted for general welfare or public safety purposes where the statu-
tory vehicle for aid is neutral both on its face and in application.
The Supreme Court's continued reliance on narrow factual distinc-
tions in establishment clause cases has created a mounting confu-
sion,207 which can only be remedied by adopting a new approach.
The area could be greatly clarified by adopting a constitutional bal-
ancing of the free exercise and establishment clauses. Such a bal-
ance would preserve unfettered exercise of religion by allowing
governmental assistance to religious institutions, but only to the
extent that the effect of such aid does not favor one religious group
over another. So long as the aid works to advance the interests of
particularized religious groups, however, it cannot be justified by
the utilitarian argument that the benefited institutions contribute
to social value.208
Balancing the two religion clauses further requires that the
Court evaluate the actual primary effect of the aid in question,
thus giving at least some consideration to generalized data regard-
ing the benefited class. A statistical guarantee of neutrality,209 as-
suring that the amount of aid does not exceed the value of the
206. See supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text. But see Note, Rebuilding the
Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUm. L. REv. 1963 (1981) (proposing application of a strict neu-
trality standard barring all state aid of whatever amount and form which re-
sults in advancing religion, even indirectly).
207. In addition to Mueller, the Court decided Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330
(1983), and Larken v. Grendels Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982). In Larkin the
Court held that a Massachusetts zoning law which permitted churches and
schools to "veto" the granting of liquor licenses within 500 feet of such institu-
tions was unconstitutional. In contrast to Mueller, the Larkin Court con-
cluded that the statute's effect exceeded the strict standard applied in
Nyquist of "remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious institu-
tions." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
784 n.39 (1973) (emphasis added). Marsh raises the possiblity that the tripar-
tite test will be avoided entirely when the Court chooses to carve out an ex-
ception to establishment clause doctrine based on historical (and perhaps
other) reasons. See supra note 26.
These most recent decisions strongly reinforce the characterization of the
Court's approach to establishment clause questions as an "analytical subter-
fuge permitting the court to justify its holdings in the name of judicial stan-
dards, but without forcing the [C]ourt to have any enduring standards."
Devins, Inconsistent Standard of Review in Last Term's Establishment Cases,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 3, 1983, at 24 col. 3.
208. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. See also Choper, supra note 44
(proposing a constitutional standard under which governmental aid to paro-
chial schools is constitutional to the extent that it does not exceed the value
of secular services provided). Cf. Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE LJ. 692 (1968) (proposing that the es-
tablishment clause be read to prohibit only aid which has as its motive or
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secular benefits provided, would affirm the separation and neutral-
ity principles of the establishment clause.
The recommended balancing test would also enable the Court
to fully develop a posture of "benevolent neutrality." On the one
hand, the Court would preserve the free exercise of religion
through secular aid, while restricting aid which results in favoring
particular religions or which results in government interference
with the exercise of religion, on the other.
In order to properly apply this balancing test, the Court should
adopt a more intrusive inquiry into the secular purpose criterion of
the three-part test. By duly recognizing the non-secular purposes
of programs which aid religious institutions, the Court will be
forced to weigh legitimate benefits of free exercise of religion
against the dangers, under the establishment clause, of contact be-
tween church and state. The Court's present cursory analysis
under the secular purpose prong threatens to misstate, understate,
or even ignore proper free exercise interests.
This balancing approach is further based on consistent identifi-
cation of establishment clause values, which will result in greater
certainty and guidance to the states in formulating aid programs.
The proposed approach would allow states to focus on the sub-
stance and effect of a particular aid program rather than on the
form and manner of distributing the aid. Most importantly, how-
ever, a balancing approach will require that any aid which ad-
vances identifiable religious groups must be justified and
compelled by overriding free exercise interests. Free exercise in-
terests would compel aid where necessary to preserve religious au-
tonomy, and where governmental interference in religion can be
avoided. The majority in Mueller failed to require proponents of
aid to demonstrate such compelling free exercise interests. Proper
consideration of free exercise burdens in a constitutional balanc-
ing with establishment clause objectives will avoid improper Court
excursions into legislative and social policy development based on
adjudicatory facts. 2 10 To the extent that balancing the principles of
separation and neutrality results in restrictions on Mueller-type
aid, the separation which is gained will serve to strengthen reli-
gious institutions211 and redirect government programs toward le-
substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or practice, and that aid
which helps implement privately made religious choice is lawful).
210. See supra note 29. See also M. HowE, supra note 202, at 168; Schotten, supra
note 25, at 238-40.
211. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text. See also, P. KAUPER, supra
note 188, at 143. Kauper suggests that this religious freedom is directly sup-
portive of the national strength of the United States:
The inner strength and vitality of religious societies and of religious
life generally in the United States ... demonstrates that the free
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gitimate secular ends.212
Keith E. Moxon '85
church, deriving its strength from voluntary adherence and support,
assures the maximum of religious liberty and offers the greatest
promise for the cultivation and release of the spiritual power and
moral insights that constitute a nation's inner strength.
Id. at 142-43.
212. The cost of federal tuition tax credits, see supra note 6, has been estimated at
$726 million to $779 million by 1987. EDuc. AND WELFARE Drv., CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV. 11, TunON TAx CREDrrs IsSUE BRIEF No. 1B81075 (updated
Sept. 13, 1983).
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